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Abstract 
The concept of “structural stability” has been gaining prominence in development policy 
circles. In the EU’s and the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (OECD DAC) 
understanding, it describes the ability of societies to handle intra-societal conflict without 
resorting to violence. This study investigates the preconditions of structural stability and 
tests their mutual interconnections. Seven dimensions are analyzed: (1) long-term eco-
nomic growth, (2) environmental security, (3) social equality, (4) governmental effective-
ness, (5) democracy, (6) rule of law, and (7) inclusion of identity groups. The postulated 
mutual enhancement of the seven dimensions is plausible but cannot be proven. The most 
significant positive relationship appears between “democracy” and “rule of law,” respec-
tively, on the one hand and the dependent variable “violence/ human security” on the 
other hand. This points to the usefulness of the political concept of structural stability to 
promote development policy agendas in this area at least. Applications that reach beyond 
these initial findings will, however, require further research. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Strukturelle Stabilität:  
Analyse der Voraussetzungen für gewaltfreies Konfliktmanagement 
Entwicklungspolitiker nehmen häufig Bezug auf das Konzept der “strukturellen Stabilität”. 
Die EU und das OECD-DAC verstehen darunter die Fähigkeit von Gesellschaften, innerge-
sellschaftliche Konflikte ohne Gewalt auszutragen. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die 
Voraussetzungen für strukturelle Stabilität und deren Interdependenzen. Die analysierten 
Dimensionen umfassen langfristiges Wirtschaftswachstum, ökologische Sicherheit, soziale 
Sicherheit, administrative Leistungsfähigkeit, Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Inklusion 
von Identitätsgruppen. Die angenommene gegenseitige Verstärkung der sieben Dimensio-
nen ist plausibel, kann aber durch die statistische Analyse nicht nachgewiesen werden. Der 
größte positive Zusammenhang zeigt sich zwischen „Demokratie“ und „Rechtsstaatlichkeit“ 
auf der einen und der abhängigen Variable „Gewalt“/„menschliche Sicherheit“ auf der an-
deren Seite. Dies lässt die Nützlichkeit des politischen Konzeptes der strukturellen Stabilität 
vermuten, in diesem Bereich entwicklungspolitische Ansätze zu fördern. Allerdings bedür-
fen darüber hinausgehende Anwendungen weiterer ausführlicher Forschung. 
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1 Introduction 
The present study scrutinizes the prerequisites of “structural stability”—understood as the abil-
ity of societies to deal with their conflicts nonviolently. Structural stability has political, eco-
nomic, ecological, and social components. From the official definitions of the EU (1996) and the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC, 1997) it is possible to derive seven 
dimensions (cf. Mehler 2002): long-term economic growth, environmental security, social 
equality, government effectiveness, democracy, rule of law, and inclusion of identity groups. 
The context of the EU’s and the OECD’s preoccupation with the topic in the 1990s was the 
completely new manifestation of political competition (or a changed perception of it) after the 
end of the Cold War: the “third wave” of democratization on the one hand and the increase of 
violent conflicts related to the deterioration of states—“failing states”—or similarly labeled 
phenomena on the other. Both organizations have therefore limited their designations—based 
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on practical imperatives and a minimal consensus of normative orientation—solely to states 
going through fundamental change. The Portuguese presidency of the EU (2007) prepared a 
study with “structural stability” in its title.1 However, such an action is taking the second step 
before the first by solidifying arguments and conflating political elements instead of verifying 
scientifically postulated correlations. The present study is set to initiate the latter step. 
The premise (in the EU definition) that the identified dimensions of structural stability are 
closely related and enhance each other is significant for development cooperation. It follows 
that the promotion of one pillar can have positive effects on another. However, the reverse 
correlation could hold as well: the status of one dimension could decline due to the strength-
ening of another (especially if unintended effects occur). Herein lies the scientific interest: It 
seems possible that a short-term objective in one dimension of structural stability could inter-
fere with a goal within another dimension. Linear correlations are therefore not necessarily to 
be expected. In order to test the assumed correlations, the creation of adequate hypotheses 
and their operationalization and verification/falsification is required. 
This study has four objectives: (1) The creation of a complete set of indicators to assess the 
seven dimensions of structural stability, (2) the development of profiles of structural stabil-
ity/instability, (3) the formation of clusters of countries which have certain characteristics in 
common and the depiction of types of structural instability (or of deficits in structural stabil-
ity, respectively), and (4) the presentation of initial deliberations on the verification/concep-
tion of the assumed reciprocal enhancement and interconnection of the seven dimensions of 
structural stability. For this purpose, correlations of the relations of the seven dimensions to 
one another are tested statistically. 
The structure of the paper will be as follows. In the second section we present the indicators 
used for the seven dimensions, which are defined as independent variables. Violence/human 
security is the dependent variable. A calculation of partial correlations follows. The partly in-
adequate quality of data allows only for cautious conclusions. Section 4 presents the struc-
tural stability “profiles” of the 58 countries selected2 and discusses the clustering of cases. 
Section 5 summarizes the main findings and presents issues for further research. 
2 Indicators and Data Sources 
The selection of indicators used is outlined below and the data sources are specified. The 
relevant literature regarding each of the seven dimensions was extensively analyzed by the 
project team. Due to restricted space it cannot be discussed in detail in this article.3 
                                                     
1  Promoting Structural Stability. EU Response Strategy to Fragile Situations and Difficult Environments, 
ECDPM/IEEI, Maastricht/Lisbon (Draft, July 2007). 
2  The selection criterion was the status as “partner country” of the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) which funded the original study this Working Paper is based on. 
3  For a more extensive discussion of the literature and indicators used please contact the authors of this study 
in order to access the original study document. 
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2.1 Long-term Economic Growth 
Economic growth refers to a state in which macroeconomic assets (including natural re-
sources) increase, or at least do not decrease, and which is manifested by a growing per cap-
ita income over the course of time. Long-term economic growth depends on the capability of 
increasing the accumulation of physical and human capital and on increased productivity 
due to technological progress. 
The recognized indicator for economic growth is the productivity with which states make use 
of their productive resources (physical, human, and natural capital). Because an accurate 
quantification of productivity proves to be difficult, economists usually apply the GDP or 
GNP instead. The advantages of this procedure are, firstly, that the GDP/GNP is easy to 
measure; secondly, that the GDP/GNP is a rough measure for the relative productivity of re-
source deployment; and thirdly, that it measures relative material welfare, irrespective of the 
sources of growth (for example, favorable natural resources as opposed to the effective pro-
ductivity of their use). Thus, for the study of structural stability the following indicators were 
considered: 1) real GNP per capita, 2) real GDP per capita, and 3) real GDP per capita in pur-
chasing power parity (PPP). 
Although some criticisms regarding per capita income as an indicator of economic growth 
can be found in the literature (for example, it does not express income disparity; it does not 
measure social progress and “quality of life,” or the informal or black economy), this measure 
was selected. The reason for its selection is the relatively good comparability between coun-
tries, its broad acceptance in scientific research, and the discriminatory power in regard to 
other dimensions of structural stability. An indicator equally powerful and capable of resolv-
ing the criticism is unknown so far. 
As, since the early 1990s, the real GDP4 per capita has replaced the GNP5 worldwide as the 
dominant indicator of economic growth, it was selected for this study. Unfortunately, it was 
not possible to use GDP per capita in purchasing power parity due to a lack of adequate data 
for all countries investigated. The annual growth in GDP per capita indicator is a widely rec-
ognized measure for almost all economic studies on growth with regard to sustainability, 
speed, determinants, and effects of allocation, among others. For example, annual data for 
this indicator can be found in the Penn World Table for at least 188 states from 1950 until to-
day. In addition to the Penn World Table, annual growth in GDP per capita (percent) is pub-
lished by the IMF, the World Bank (for example, in the World Development Indicators data-
base), and the UN Statistics Division. 
                                                     
4  GDP measures the sum of the value added by the labor and capital of all citizens (resident units), plus the 
taxes on production and import, minus the subsidies (= net national income), plus write-offs (= gross national 
income). 
5  Real GNP per capita (at constant prices) measures the aggregate output of a given economy. In the output 
compilation it is based on the sum of all production values (domestic concept); all goods and services pro-
duced in a country, valued at market prices of a reference year; plus product taxes and minus advance pay-
ments and subsidies. 
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2.2 Environmental Security 
Environmental security describes the lowest possible amount of environmental stress a state 
or society, respectively, is exposed to. Environmental stress is defined as the lasting and/or 
sudden negative change of an ecosystem. 
In the search for applicable indicators, sudden sporadic shocks (such as tsunamis, for exam-
ple) were disregarded as they can hardly be registered in time series. Also, human vulner-
ability was excluded as an important component for indicators, since a comprehensive un-
derstanding is difficult to achieve. Based on these considerations, the focus was placed on 
environmental stress with regard to water, population, and soil. The problem ensued that 
environmental issues and natural premises (forest stand, water supply, deserts) differ greatly 
between countries and are therefore difficult to compare globally. Therefore, an initial set of 
indicators of key factors of environmental stress had to be discarded due to problems of 
comparability: 1) population growth, 2) basic food insecurity, 3) soil, and 4) potable water. 
For the same reason, two combined environmental indicators also had to be discarded: 1) in-
dicators from the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 2006 and 2) indicators from the 
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) 2005. 
The selection of data sources proved to be difficult. Due to a lack of more adequate data 
sources, two indicators from the seventh millennium development goal (ensure environ-
mental sustainability) had to be drawn upon: 
1) Population with access to improved drinking water: this indicator, with data available 
for 1990 and 2004, on the one hand indicates the quantity and quality of potable water 
available and on the other hand evaluates the role of states in ensuring access to it. As an 
indicator of the Millennium Development Goals, it is widely recognized. 
2) Slum population as percentage of urban population: this indicator, with data available 
for 1990 and 2001, indicates potential environmental stress due to insufficient sewage 
and waste disposal in slums. This indicator is therefore not an outcome-based indicator, 
as it reflects a phenomenon creating environmental stress. Additionally, it provides in-
formation on how governments fight the causes of environmental stress. 
The disadvantages of the indicators selected for the dimension of environmental stress are 
their possible partial overlaps with the dimension of “government effectiveness,” and the fact 
that data is only available for 1990 and 2004, or 1990 and 2001, respectively. Nonetheless, af-
ter close examination, it was determined that these internationally recognized indicators did 
not correlate with indicators of “government effectiveness,” at least not significantly. To en-
sure improved comparability between the states, these two indicators were aggregated. This 
helped—to some extent—to qualify the problem of the countries’ different initial situations 
with regard to the different dimensions of environmental security. For example, an initial 
situation of a low reserve of potable water (resulting automatically in negative values) can be 
put in perspective by adding a value for slum population as an indicator of another dimen-
sion of environmental stress. 
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2.3 Social Equality 
Social equality describes a status in which all individuals have equal chances and opportuni-
ties to live their chosen way of life without having to endure extreme deprivations. These op-
portunities have to encompass access to assets and resources (including public services and 
political power). 
Social inequality within states is reflected in a disparate allocation of economic, political, and 
social resources based on group and individual differences such as group identity, gender, 
level of prosperity, or geographic position. Often promoted by the elites, these inequalities 
are internalized by the marginalized or dominated parts of the population. Social inequality 
tends to be reproduced over the course of time and over generations and thus often remains a 
lasting condition. 
Indicators that measure mainly the distribution of results and only indirectly the distribution 
of opportunities seem favorable. The following indicators were considered: 1) the Human 
Development Index (HDI), 2) stunting rates, 3) the Gini Index, and 4) income percentile ratios 
(quintiles, deciles, percentiles). 
The Gini Index6 has few overlaps with indicators of other dimensions of structural stability. 
Furthermore, from an economic point of view, it is assumed that the distribution of income/ 
consumption reflects both the access individuals have to goods and services and their per-
sonal welfare. In this sense a connection can be drawn to the level of education or health care. 
Finally, if prosperity is connected to higher political influence, income- or consumption-based 
inequality can, conversely, also reflect low chances of exerting political influence (World 
Bank, 2005, pp. 36f.). 
The Gini Index is the most suitable for measuring dimensions of “social equality” with re-
gard to structural stability.7 Although the collection frequency and the quality of the data dif-
fer for the various states, the quality of the data for most of the 58 countries of our sample is 
relatively good (as opposed, for example, to the income percentile ratios). For most of the 
countries, data is available for various years over a period from 1990 until today. 
                                                     
6  The Gini Index measures the scale of variance in regard to a perfect allocation of income or consumption be-
tween the individuals/households of an economy. The Lorenz curve is used to show the cumulative percental 
distribution of different parts of the population to the national income (classified after consecutive income 
brackets, beginning with the lowest group). The Gini coefficient takes up values between 0 (= total equality) 
and 1 (= total inequality). The index is available for at least 152 states, for different points in time between 
1950 and today (based on national household polls taken at varying intervals). 
7  Nevertheless, in using the Gini Index one has to consider two aspects that are not optimal: on the one hand, 
comparability of the states (with regard to differing databases to measure indicators (income/consumption), 
differing itemization of consumer goods, differing income data based on household polls etc.) and, on the 
other hand, the capability of describing different configurations of income distributions (a strong equality in 
lower income with a strong disparity in higher income could generate the same coefficient as a strong dispar-
ity in lower groups with strong equality in higher groups). 
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2.4 Government Effectiveness 
Government effectiveness is understood by Grindle (1996, p. 10) as the “ability of states to de-
liver goods and services […] and carry out the normal administrative functions of govern-
ment, such as revenue collection, necessary economic regulation, and information manage-
ment.” Typically, a high level of government effectiveness would be denoted by the state’s 
ability to implement policy and to prepare policies based on expertise. 
In searching for data sources, the problem of how to depict the level of government effective-
ness of a given state comprehensively and validly arose. This is why generally acknowledged 
perception indicators, which depict perceptions by experts, were short-listed above others: 1) 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)—category: steering capability; 2) Governance In-
dex/Governance Matters V (Kaufmann et al., 2006)—category: government effectiveness; 3) 
Transparency International (TI)—Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI); 4) World Bank Doing 
Business—indicator: Starting a Business. 
The range of available indicators is limited, as most (CPI, BTI, and Starting a Business) depict 
only a section of government effectiveness as it is understood by this project. Government ef-
fectiveness as measured by the Governance Index,8 on the other hand, captures the effective-
ness of the administration of a given state, incorporates 31 sources, stretches back to 1996, 
and guarantees discriminatory power against the indicators of the other six dimensions of 
structural stability. Therefore, it is used here as the indicator for the operationalization of 
government effectiveness. 
2.5 Democracy 
Democracy is defined as the entire adult population being able to participate in political deci-
sion making by voting in regular, free, and fair elections, in which multiple interest groups or 
candidates, respectively, compete freely for votes to win the highest political positions (a seat 
in parliament or the presidency). This should ensure a peaceful transfer of political power. As 
long as elections are accepted by everybody involved as open, free, and fair, election results 
can be deemed democratic. 
In searching for valid data sources, we encountered the problem that with regard to several 
aspects of constitutional practice or reality, aggregated data is scarce. Following the working 
definition, several internationally recognized indicators were scrutinized, of which the fol-
lowing had to be discarded because they were inconclusive: 
                                                     
8  Governance Matters V offers an aggregated indicator for 213 states and territories compiled from data from 
various institutions. The indicator “government effectiveness” is defined as “the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of pol-
icy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.” 
The single indicators of 31 sources from 25 different organizations are not disaggregated. Kaufmann et al. use 
a so-called unobserved components model to construe aggregated indicators. 
Mehler et al.: Structural Stability: On the Prerequisites of Nonviolent Conflict Management 11 
1) Polity IV—indicators from five categories: Executive Recruitment and Political Composi-
tion and Opposition, Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment, Competitiveness of Ex-
ecutive Recruitment, Openness of Executive Recruitment, Regulation of Participation and 
the Competitiveness of Participation 
2) Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)—subcategory of political participation: free and 
fair elections 
3) Freedom House (FH)—subcategory of political rights: electoral process 
Only one indicator covers a longer period of time: Freedom House (FH)-political rights cate-
gory.9 The FH indicator includes elaborate questions regarding electoral processes, political 
pluralism and participation, and government functions. Therefore, it qualifies as a data 
source in regard to political competition, which is part of the definition above. The indicator 
provides data on 192 states for the period from 1972 to 2005. As mentioned above, this indica-
tor has been chosen as the second best indicator after the FH electoral process indicator, as 
both categories correlate highly and therefore have a similar validity. The FH political rights 
indicator has a scale of values from one to seven, with seven being the lowest value and one 
being the highest. An operationalization of Freedom House means applying a perception in-
dicator, which is not free of methodological doubt. After testing it in regard to the working 
definition, the extent of data for the countries concerned, and its temporal dimension, it 
proved to be an applicable indicator. Slight overlaps with the dimension “rule of law” had to 
be accepted due to the lack of more suitable indicators. 
2.6 Rule of Law 
Rule of law is given when freedom and legal certainty is secured for individuals. The authori-
ties of the state do not act arbitrarily but rather within the civil rights (constitution) proclaimed 
by the people or their representatives; governmental actions serve law and justice while being 
under independent juridical control, and individuals are guaranteed steadfast civil rights. 
In consequence of the definition and cornerstones mentioned above, the operationalization of 
the dimension has to emphasize not only individual civil rights, but also juridical control 
over executive actions. A variety of internationally recognized indicators were scrutinized, of 
which the following had to be discarded as inconclusive in terms of time covered and empiri-
cal manifestations included: 1) Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)—category: rule of 
law; 2) World Bank Doing Business—indicator: enforcing contracts; 3) World Bank Govern-
ance Indicators by Kaufmann/Kraay/Mastruzzi—indicator: rule of law; 4) Freedom House 
(FH)—subcategory of civil liberty: rule of law; 5) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
political risk data—category: law and order. 
                                                     
9  As data is available for 2006 only, we decided to use the category political rights, which is available for a 
longer period, as a replacement indicator for the more precise electoral process subcategory. Both categories 
show a high correlation and prove, likewise, to be convincing, cf. Freedom House Methodology 2006: 
<www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&yera=2006> (last accessed May 22, 2007). 
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The recorded data shows that only one indicator complied with the requirements in regard to 
quality and long-term time frame: Freedom House (FH)—category: civil liberty.10 The FH 
civil liberty category offers an aggregated index of four elements (freedom of expression and 
belief, association and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual 
rights). The category refers above all to fundamental liberties to be guaranteed by the state 
under rule of law (principle of substantive law), but through the subcategory rule of law it re-
fers also to further cornerstones of rule of law as defined above (separation of powers, legal 
certainty and protection, equality before the law). The FH indicator has data on 192 states for 
the period from 1973 to 2006. It has a scale of values from one to seven, with seven being the 
lowest value and one being the highest. An operationalization of the FH indicator means the 
application of a perception indicator, which is not free from methodological doubts. Yet, after 
scrutinizing the source in regard to our working definition, the extent of the available data, 
and the time frame, it proved to be valid. 
2.7 Inclusion of Identity Groups 
The inclusion of identity groups means the acknowledgement of specific social groups as 
well as their integration into political decision-making processes. This refers to social groups 
which differ from other groups through identity-forming characteristics and which are sys-
tematically discriminated against. The definition restricts itself to conflict-relevant reference 
areas such as ethnicity and religion. 
The database for a worldwide comparison of this dimension proved to be very poor. Interest-
ing current databases such as Minority at Risk turned out to be fragmentary in regard to the 
states considered. Part of the information is only available for the years up to 2000. A second 
indicator taken into account for religion had to be discarded: the Cingranelli (CIRI) Human 
Rights Dataset—indicator: Freedom of Religion.11 It was not suitable for the correlation calcu-
lation. Besides, only religious identities could be depicted. 
Due to the problem of having only insufficient indicators at hand, we had to construct an in-
dicator of our own. The Crises Indicators Catalogue (Krisenindikatorenkatalog, KIK) com-
piled annually by the GIGA for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (BMZ) was used. Suitable indicators for both reference areas (religion and ethnicity) 
could not be determined, although the term “cultural identity” would suggest the inclusion 
of religious groups as well. Due to the unfavorable data situation, a restriction to only one in-
dicator (focusing on ethnicity) had to be carried out; from analysis sector 1 (structural dispari-
ties) and analysis sector 4 (transformation and modernization processes), the following ques-
tions were combined into an indicator: 
                                                     
10  The FH rule of law subcategory evaluates separation of powers, legal certainty, legal protection, and equality 
before the law. As a single category it is available for 2006 only and therefore does not allow for temporal 
comparisons. 
11  Cf. CIRI Human Rights Data project: <http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/ciri_variables_short_descrip 
tions.pdf> (last accessed Feb. 27, 2007). 
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1.1 Is there any significant correlation between the distribution of wealth and group identities 
based on having a common cultural, regional, social or political identity? (Answers: no, yes) 
1.2 Is there a clear dominance of such groups in the composition of political actors or institu-
tions or is such a dominance perceived by the population? (Answers: no; yes, namely in: a) 
executive, legislative, judiciary, b) other political institutions—multiple answers possible) 
1.3 Are groups mentioned under 1.1 discriminated against politically, economically or cul-
turally—be it officially/formally or de facto? (Answers: no, yes) 
1.4 Does the country have any valuable natural resources which might be an incentive for 
potential warlords? (Answers: no; yes, groups willing to use violence can fall back on 
other financing sources (e.g. trafficking in drugs or human beings, smuggling, radical di-
aspora groups)—multiple answers possible)12 
4.2 Will competition between the groups mentioned under 1.1 to 1.4 intensify as a result of 
these changes [in the political, economic or social structures]? (Answers: no, or it will be 
diminished; yes, with a) it will be intensified, b) one or more groups perceive these 
changes as a threat to their existence—multiple answers in the “yes” category possible) 
Questions 1.1-1.4 and 4.2 were used as follows: 
• No question answered with “yes” = 5 
• One question answered with “yes” = 4 
• Two questions answered with “yes” = 3 
• Three questions answered with “yes” = 2 
• Four questions answered with “yes” = 1 
• All four questions answered with “yes” and question 4.2 additionally answered with “yes” 
plus “in the perception of one or more groups these changes pose an existential threat” = 0. 
This results in the following categories: 
0 = significant group disparities and strong states of competition and existential threat 
through change 
1 = significant group disparities with regard to distribution of wealth, political domination, 
discrimination, and control over resources 
2 = relatively strong group disparities with regard to distribution of wealth, political domi-
nation, discrimination, and control over resources 
3 = moderate group disparities with regard to distribution of wealth, political domination, 
discrimination, and control over resources 
4 = minimal group disparities with regard to distribution of wealth, political domination, 
discrimination, and control over resources 
5 = no group disparities 
                                                     
12  Valuable natural resources could be accessed, distributed and sold by a dominant social group. 
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The indicator incorporates essential questions of inclusion. Although the crisis early warn-
ing indicators are perception indicators, which partially weakens their impact, and even 
though data was available only for 1999, 2000/01 and 2003–2005, they proved to be valid in 
the correlations. 
2.8 Dependent Variable: Violence/Human Security 
Violence exists mainly in two variants, or dimensions: first, in war-like conflicts with a high 
intensity of violence and, secondly, in an often less apparent although equally serious every-
day violence, manifested in murder, manslaughter, robbery, and rape (violence understood 
as a direct physical act between individuals or groups of individuals). Both dimensions are 
signs of structural instability and are therefore considered in this project. 
The data situation on everyday violence proved to be inadequate for a worldwide compari-
son. Potentially the best data source is Interpol, which collects the statistics of more than 180 
countries (member states). Unfortunately, this data is usually available for police personnel 
only. Furthermore, Interpol warns against using these data sets for cross-national comparison 
as criminal acts are defined differently depending on the state and the statistical methods 
used in collecting the data. Interpol declined our request to use their database, highlighting 
the incompleteness of data as well as the different national codings, making a useful com-
parison of data sets impossible. 
What is available, although it most certainly shows the same problems as Interpol’s data, is 
the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems from 
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Data on everyday crime from 1970 to 2002 is included,13 
although the number of states that have provided their national data varies greatly. Data on 
several countries from our sample are not considered at all, or only sporadically at best. 
An initial test compilation of the category “homicides completed”—a category available for 
the UN survey 2003/04—was carried out for the countries of our sample for the period 1990–
2004. However, it proved to be incomplete and insufficient for any concrete correlation and 
therefore had to be discarded. 
For the analysis of wars or civil war-like conflicts, respectively, a broad set of data sources can 
be found. However, the majority of data sets scrutinized were insufficient in meeting the pro-
ject’s required criteria concerning the dependent variable. The main problem was that the data 
is usually gathered about a conflict, not about a state. Furthermore, the total number of conflicts 
varied, depending on the data sets’ respective criteria for an entry in the conflict lists (for in-
stance, Peace and Conflict reports only if the toll reaches 1000 conflict-related fatalities, whereas 
Uppsala and Battle Deaths report at 25 fatalities [cf. Battle Deaths Dataset]). Some data sets are 
fragmentary; others are questionable as to plausibility and validity. Categorizations of the in-
tensity of conflicts were mostly inadequate. The indicator Battle Deaths, used by some of the 
                                                     
13  A survey for 2003 and 2004 is forthcoming. 
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data sources, is problematic in several respects. The following data sources had to be discarded: 
1) Battle Deaths Dataset (1946–2005), 2) Heidelberg Institut für Internationale Konfliktfor-
schung—Konfliktbarometer (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research—Conflict 
Barometer), 3) Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF), 4) Correlates of War 
(COW), 5) Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946–2006, 6) PRIO (Peace Research Institute 
Oslo), 7) Armed Conflict Dataset, 8) Uppsala Conflict Database—Online (1989–2005). 
The following three individual data sets from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
were combined to form an indicator that could reach beyond battle deaths with regard to 
conflict-related victims: 
• Battle Deaths Dataset (information on the low, best, and high estimate for fatalities in 
armed conflicts where at least one party is the government of a state, 2002–2005) 
• Non-state Conflict Dataset (a conflict-year data set with information on communal and or-
ganized armed conflict where none of the parties is the government of a state, 2002–2005) 
• One-sided Violence Dataset (an actor-year data set with information on intentional at-
tacks on civilians by governments and formally organized armed groups, 1989–2005) 
Nevertheless, the resulting indicator also proved to be fragmentary and questionable with 
regard to the data situation and also had to be discarded. 
After scrutinizing several examples of states with regard to the classification of the intensity 
of conflicts, the data source outlined in the following section qualified as a conclusive indica-
tor for the dependent variable “violence”/“human security.” 
2.9 Peace and Conflict—Human Security Subindex 
Peace and Conflict 2005 by Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr of the Center for Interna-
tional Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) provides an assessment of conflict 
situations worldwide. The aggregate category peace-building capacity as a composite indica-
tor had to be discarded because it incorporates crucial dimensions of structural stability. The 
human security subindex, however, complied with the project’s understanding of structural 
stability. It evaluates the overall quality of human security in a country for the period 1991–
2000 and encompasses the following components: 
• armed conflicts and rebellions, 
• intercommunal fighting, 
• refugee and internally displaced populations, 
• state repression, 
• terrorism, and, in a few cases, 
• genocide. 
The subindex arranges human security into four levels: (1) countries that have performed well 
and have experienced little or no human security problems during the previous ten-year pe-
riod, (2) countries that have had some human security problems but not at higher levels as 
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noted below, (3) countries that have had problems of a somewhat lower magnitude over a 
more limited span of time, (4) countries that have had a generally high level of human security 
problems in several of the categories over a substantial period of time. The disadvantage of the 
comparatively short time frame (1991–2000) had to be accepted for want of a better indicator. 
3 Cross-sectional Analysis: Human Security and the Dimensions of Structural Stability 
The following analysis serves to verify the relationship between the dependent variable, vio-
lence/human security, chosen in the project (data source: human security subindex of the 
Peace and Conflict Index, CIDCM) and the independent variables that were selected as indica-
tors for the previously presented seven dimensions of structural stability. The starting point is 
the assumption that the structural stability of the studied countries—understood as their abil-
ity to deal with conflicts nonviolently—is strongly related, as previously mentioned, to long-
term economic growth, environmental security, social equality, government effectiveness, 
democracy, rule of law, and the inclusion of identity groups. The sample is based on the list of 
BMZ partner countries. Therefore, the range of countries available for analysis has been lim-
ited; case selection does not reflect scientific criteria alone. The number of cases has been fur-
ther reduced from 65 BMZ partner countries to 58 due to the poor availability of data in the 
cases of Afghanistan, the Palestinian Territories, East Timor, Cuba, Eritrea, Lesotho, and Mau-
ritania. “Access to improved drinking water,” “percentage of slum population,” and the Gini 
coefficient are the variables that are particularly deficient in terms of data availability. 
For all independent variables, the average value has been taken for the period 1991–2000; for 
the indicators of environmental security it is given until 2001 and 2004 because the average 
value of the dependent variable is indicated accordingly.14 
In almost all cases the expected positive or negative relation is given, although in some cases 
only very weakly. In some cases the relation is even inverse to the expectation. A relatively 
strong linear relation is shown between human security and the indicators for democracy 
(Freedom House political rights indicator) and rule of law (Freedom House civil liberty indi-
cator). The “political rights” variable as well as the “civil liberty” variable display values 
from one to seven. In both cases an increasing value marks deterioration. The particular re-
gression lines illustrate that an increasing value for the “political rights” and “civil liberty” 
variables (which means fewer rights) is accompanied by a deterioration of human security. 
In a similar way, a negative relation can be shown for the indicators of “government effec-
tiveness” and “inclusion of identity groups” (BMZ crises indicators catalogue, KIK) with 
human security. The particular regression lines illustrate in scatterplots that higher values for 
both variables are accompanied by an amelioration of human security. For the indicators of 
                                                     
14  For the Gini Index data is available for different base years within the period mentioned for the range of 
countries. Data for the variable “population with sustainable access to improved drinking water (%)” exists 
only for 1990 and 2004, and for “slum population as % of total urban population” only for 1990 and 2001. 
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long-term economic growth (per capita growth rates [%]) and environmental security (sus-
tainable access to improved water sources [%]; slum population [%]), no clear picture 
emerges. The relation between the indicator for social equality (Gini coefficient) and human 
security was even inverse to expectations. With decreasing Gini values, the value for human 
security sinks as well, which would mean that greater social inequality is related to an im-
proved situation for human security. The result is biased by an outlier result for Namibia. If 
Namibia is removed from the sample, an unclear picture of a “point cloud” arises that does 
not imply an explicit correlation. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the pair-wise correlation of the independent variables with 
the dependent variable (value of human security). This is relevant for the question regarding 
the correlation between stability and the seven dimensions discussed (see marking in the first 
column). The table shows that none of the independent variables tested exhibits a strong cor-
relation with the dependent variable of human security. Four of the variables, however, prove 
to be significantly and moderately correlated with the dependent variable.15 These are the Gini 
coefficient (-0.33*); “political rights” (0.36*); “civil liberty” (0.46*); and “inclusion,” based on 
the BMZ crises indicators catalogue (-0.35*). In contrast, the Gini coefficient is negatively corre-
lated with the dependent variable—contrary to what was expected. This result is therefore 
hardly possible to interpret in terms of the question posed. The reason remains somewhat un-
clear and must be predominately attributed to limited data quality and several outliers, which 
distort the calculation of the relationship between the Gini coefficient and human security. All 
other significant relations correspond to their algebraic sign, which indicates the direction of 
the relation between the variables and the a priori expectations. Poor political rights as well as 
limited civil liberties accompany low human security or higher conflict intensity, respectively. 
In contrast, with a high level of inclusion of identity groups, human security is higher; thus, by 
implication, human security is lower in cases of a high level of exclusion (see Table 1). 
This means that, at least for this study and for the entire 58 cases, long-term economic growth, 
environmental security, social equality, and government effectiveness have little significance 
for structural stability. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that a) indicators other 
than the ones carefully chosen offer a better approximation and that b) in certain historical 
constellations these variables (depicted by the chosen indicators) do hold explanatory power. 
It is also possible that the concept (developed from a political perspective) has limitations in 
terms of validity. This delineates other tasks that cannot be covered by this study. 
More interesting are the remaining independent variables characterized by a positive correla-
tion with the dependent variable: democracy, rule of law, and inclusion of identity groups 
apparently hold more explanatory power, as shown in the following steps of the analysis (see 
Section 4 below). 
                                                     
15  The level of significance shows that the respective variables are indeed relevant in their relation with the de-
pendent variable, but not how strong this relation is. It should by no means be concluded that the respective 
variable plays a special role in the tested context based solely on the level of significance. 
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Table 1: Correlations between the Seven Dimensions of Structural Stability and with 
Human Security 
Variables Human 
security 
Per capita  
growth rates 
(p.a.) 
Access to  
improved  
water  
(% of  
total  
population)
Slum  
population 
(% of 
total urban 
population)
Standardized: 
access to  
improved 
water/ 
slum  
population 
Gini  
coefficient
Government 
effectiveness
Political  
rights  
(Freedom 
House) 
Civil  
liberty  
(Freedom 
House) 
Inclusion 
(from BMZ 
crises  
indicator) 
Human security 1.00          
Per capita  
growth rates (p.a.) 
0.05 1.00         
Access to  
improved water  
(% of total  
population) 
0.16 0.23 1.00        
Slum population  
(% of total  
urban population) 
-0.12 -0.26 -0.77* 1.00       
Standardized:  
access to  
improved water/ 
slum population 
0.15 0.26 0.94* -0.94* 1.00      
Gini coefficient -0.33* -0.31* 0.05 -0.08 0.07* 1.00     
Government  
effectiveness 
-0.13 0.44* 0.47* -0.49* 0.51* 0.03 1.00    
Political rights  
(Freedom House) 
0.36* 0.06 -0.30* 0.13 -0.23 -0.38* -0.34* 1.00   
Civil liberty  
(Freedom House) 
0.46* 0.14 -0.27* 0.17 -0.23* -0.45* -0.38* 0.92* 1.00  
Inclusion  
(from BMZ crises  
indicator) 
-0.35* 0.32* 0.20 -0.20 0.21* -0.21 0.23 0.04 0.01 1.00 
* Significant at the minimum of a 5% level, N = 58. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
4 Types of Structural Stability 
4.1 Graphical Presentation of Structural Stability 
The analysis of the seven dimensions of structural stability shows that each country exhibits a 
specific profile. The aim of this section is the graphical presentation of these profiles. In a sec-
ond step, this leads to the formation of different types according to the countries’ respective 
expression of dimensions of structural stability. It has to be stated that this endeavor does not 
amount to a validation of the concept of structural stability; it merely aims to provide a 
graphical presentation and a categorization of different types of structural stability. For ex-
ample, an array of countries with above-average values in at least five dimensions can be dif-
ferentiated from another array with clearly below-average values. 
To identify and present the dimensions of structural stability for each country, a heptagon-
shaped net diagram (hereafter called a “diamond”) has been drawn up in which the average 
values of all seven dimensions studied, based on the main unit of 58 BMZ partner countries, 
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are depicted (green line) together with, simultaneously, the specific values of the dimensions 
for the particular country (red line). In this way, variances in the values of single countries from 
the average can be illustrated graphically, thus helping to identify possible patterns of variance. 
A basic prerequisite for the creation of such a graphic representation of the localization of each 
country with regard to the seven dimensions is the standardization of the variables used; that 
is, all variables must be brought to the same scale setting, where a common, standardized 
spread of the values with a mean value of 0 and a standard variance of 1 exists.16 In this case, 
the direction of the values of the variables was first standardized. All variables were to display 
amelioration with increasing values; therefore, for the following variables the values had to be 
reversed: the Gini Index for income/consumption equality (%, average for the 1990s), political 
rights (Freedom House) 1991–2000, and civil liberty (Freedom House) 1991–2000. 
One exception is the dependent variable human security, which is not represented in the 
diamonds. Its respective value is stated in a field next to the diamonds and displays a dete-
rioration of human security with an increasing value: 
• 1 = good performance, no human security problems during the previous ten-year period 
• 2 = some human security problems, not at higher levels 
• 3 = problems of somewhat lower magnitude over a more limited span of time 
• 4 = generally high level of human security problems over a substantial period of time 
When the dark line (which marks standardized values of each dimension in the particular 
countries) moves from the average value (bright line)17 inwards, it means that the particular 
dimension has a lower value than the average. If it moves from the green line outwards, it 
displays amelioration with respect to the average. 
The graphical presentation of the countries’ seven dimensions allows for the identification of 
patterns of variance (for example, an array of countries with clearly above-average values in 
at least five dimensions compared to an array of countries with clearly below-average values 
in at least five dimensions), thus enabling a clustering and the formation of categories based 
on the countries’ human security value as well as the patterns of variance. Figures 1 and 2 
show the diamonds of the dimensions for all cases which exhibit clear patterns in terms of 
above- or below-average values. 
                                                     
16  A standardization is carried out more precisely by subtracting the arithmetical mean from each value xi of a 
spread X and dividing each resulting difference by the standard variance sx of the spread X. One obtains a z-
standardized spread Z, which has a mean value of 0 and a standard variance of 1. 
17  Originally the lines were red and green, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Country Profiles with High Structural Stability 
(Minimum of five above-average structural stability dimensions) 
a) Low Degree of Violent Conflict 
Chile and Ghana 
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Source: Authors’ representation. 
b) Medium to High Degree of Violent Conflict 
Mexico and Philippines 
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c) High Degree of Violent Conflict 
Sri Lanka and Turkey 
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Source: Authors’ representation. 
b) Medium to Low Degree of Violent Conflict 
Cameroon and Niger 
  
Source: Authors’ representation. 
c) Medium to High Degree/High Degree of Violent Conflict 
Nigeria and Burundi 
  
Source: Authors’ representation. 
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4.2 Interpretation and Clustering of Cases 
ment of the cases into different degrees of structural stability is obvioThe assign us. One-third, 
structurally stable (low level of violence); only 
egory and would be classified as “structurally unstable” 
 (see Table 2). This means that the first group of countries 
is able—all things considered—to solve or at least nonviolently handle conflicts occurring in 
a democratization process or otherwise and can be considered more likely to be shock resis-
tant. The last group, on the other hand, is extremely prone to shocks and not able to handle 
its conflicts nonviolently. 
Table 2: Classification of Countries According to Grades of Stability 
Grades of stability 
that is, 19 of 58 countries, can be classified as 
six countries fall into the lowest cat
following the applied terminology
Low  
number of  
s 
(N = 19) 
Low to medium 
number of  
violent conflicts
(N = 12) 
Medium to high 
number of  
violent conflicts
(N = 20) 
High  
number of  
violent conflicts 
(N = 7) 
violent conflict
Benin Brazil 
Bolivia 
Burkina Faso 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ghana 
Honduras 
Laos 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mongolia 
Namibia 
Tanzania 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guinea 
Yemen 
Jordan 
Cameroon 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Senegal 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
Bangladesh 
China 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Guatemala 
Cambodia 
Kenya 
Morocco 
Mexico 
Nepal 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Rwanda 
South Africa 
Chad 
Uganda 
Algeria 
Burundi 
India 
Indonesia 
Colombia 
Sri Lanka 
Turkey 
Nicaragua 
Paraguay 
Tunisia Syria 
Zambia 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Marshall/Gurr, Center for International Development and Conflict Man-
agement (CIDCM) (2005): Peace and Conflict Data 2005. 
A conclusive typology needs to incorporate a second axis of characteristics with regard to the 
independent variables. A classification based on the number of positively rated dimensions 
of structural stability (above-average values) could make sense. Table 3 provides a first indi-
cation by considering it a good precondition if five dimensions of structural stability exhibit 
above-average values and, in turn, considering it a poor precondition if five of seven dimen-
sions are below average. 
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Table 3: Preconditions of Structural Stability and Incidence of Violence* 
Dimensions of  
structural stability:  
values 
Change of regime  
and/or acts of war  
begun / ended  
1990–2000 
Low number of 
violent conflicts
Minor to medium 
number of  
violent conflicts 
Medium to high  
number of  
violent conflicts 
High  
number of  
violent conflicts
Minimum of  
5 values above  
average (n = number  
of countries) 
Change (10) Benin 
Chile 
Ghana 
Mongolia 
El Salvador 
Thailand 
Mexico 
Philippines 
Colombia 
Sri Lanka 
Turkey 
 No change (8) Costa Rica 
Tunisia 
Jordan 
Vietnam 
Egypt 
China 
India 
“Gray area” Change (24) Bolivia 
Dominican  
Republic 
Mal
P
Brazil 
Ecuador 
Mozambique 
Bangladesh 
Guatemala 
Cambodia 
Peru 
South Africa 
ga
Yem
Algeria 
Indonesia 
Honduras 
Namibia 
Senegal Nepal 
Pakistan 
awi 
i Mal
Nicaragua 
araguay 
Zambia 
U nda 
en 
 ge (2) La - Moro - No Chan os cco 
Minimum of  
5 values below 
average 
Change (12) na Faso 
car  
 
Burundi 
 
Burki
Madagas
Tanzania 
Guinea 
Cameroon
Niger 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Nigeria
Rwanda 
Chad 
 - - No change (0) - - 
Total 7  19 11 19 
* States in bold had a change of regime o  w 2000. 
Source: Authors ilation. 
Another limitation has to be brou ard: I ple the concept of structural stability 
has been postulated as being valid only for trans ates. We operationalized it in such a 
way that states satisfied this criterion if they un ent a change of regime type (for exam-
ple, introduction of a multiparty system) between 1990 and 2000 and/or if wars broke out or 
were ended. This means that the concept is not valid for ten of the 58 countries studied. Syria 
(no change) an  Coast (change of regime t ould not be assigned to the scheme due 
to a lack of crit Ultimately, we could de clear outcomes for only 45 countries 
(bold print).18 
sions of structural stability during one decade. The fact that the values vary strongly over the 
r went to/ceased ar, 1990–
’ comp
ght forw n princi
itional st
derw
d Ivory ype) c
ical data. termine 
The classification carried out above provides, at a glance, the average values of the dimen-
course of time and that in certain years a different classification would have followed cannot 
be ignored. 
As shown in the previous section, we could not find strong correlations based on the avail-
able data, much less establish causalities. Table 3 suggests, however, a certain plausibility 
                                                     
18  Yet it is plausible that states that did not undergo changes of regime type or see a war begin or end during 
this period would also react similarly in the case of such events. However, they were not exposed to such 
shocks. 
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that in the event of above-average values in five dimensions (eleven cases with changes of re-
gi gin w-a  val-
ue i hes utu men di-
m s is to some med. However,  4 
ca o not b he ese tw d within the gro oten-
tia ncing, above-  dimen ere are ase Chile, 
G olia, El Salvador, Th  which the dependent variable (human security) 
ex ibits “very strong g” With roup w otentiall tually en-
ha w-avera  d ns, th  likewise Bur thiopia, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Chad) with “very poor” or “poor” values for the dependent vari-
able. In total, only twelve of 46 ca larified,” that is, show strong and unambiguous 
relationships between the dimensio structural stability. 
Varying strongly from this logic an refore requiring explana following groups: 
• States within the gray area of not confirming but also not ing the hypothesis or 
with below-avera  ension  of structural  that n vertheless ex-
y good e a hese ei s inclu via, the 
 Republic, Hondura a, M ali, N a, and Zambia (gray 
area) as well as Burkina Faso, Madagascar, and Tanzania (be rage values). 
• States within the gray area or with a ve-average v lues in f ensions of s uctural 
ility that nevertheless exhibit a very poor value in the dependent variable. These five 
nd Turkey. It is noteworthy that 
hrough highly escalated conflicts, albeit in subregions of their na-
tional territories (this also applies to India, which has not lived through larger changes in 
ws that there is obviously a strong relationship between the combination of 
 low degree of violent conflict have positive values in both
me type or be
s in five dimens
ension
ning/ending of 
ons (twelve case
 extent confir
war) as well a
s), the hypot
s in the opposi
is of the m
 this assertion
te case of belo
al enhance
does not hold
verage
t of these 
 true for the 2
ses which d
lly mutually enha
hana, Mong
elong to eit r of th o groups. An up with p
average sions th  only six c s (Benin, 
ailand) in
h ” or “stron  values. in the g ith p y mu
ncing, belo ge marked imensio ere are  six cases ( undi, E
ses are “c
ns and 
d the tion are the 
disprov
ge values in five dim s stability e
hibit a ver
Dominican
value in th dependent v riable. T ght state de Boli
s, Namibi alawi, M icaragu
low-ave
bo a ive dim tr
stab
states include Algeria, Indonesia, Colombia, Sri Lanka, a
the last four have lived t
its system during the period studied and yet is equally “paradoxically” situated). Only 
the Algerian Civil War (1992–2002) seems to clearly exhibit more than one local dimen-
sion. Still, this could be a plausible reason why these states have worse values in the de-
pendent variable than anticipated. 
Another approach to plausible statements follows from an examination of the values in the 
formulated categories (see Table 4). 
This overview sho
democracy and rule of law and high values of structural stability. Not only the especially sta-
ble countries—with a variance from the average value of over 1.0 in both dimensions (de-
mocracy and rule of law), such as Benin, Chile, and Mongolia—but also those gray-area 
states with a  dimensions, some-
clear connection between democracy/rule of law and human security is apparent, which, on 
times twice as strong (Bolivia, Namibia).19 Within the states with below-average values with 
high stability, Madagascar still exhibits only two positive values in these dimensions. Thus, a 
                                                     
Ghana, as an exception within the category of stable countries with above-average values in the dimensions, 
exhibits 
19  
only average values for “rule of law” and “democracy.” 
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Table 4: Correlations of Stability Values with Seven Dimensions of Structural Stability* 
Stability values 
 
States Long-term 
growth 
Ecological 
security 
Social 
equality
Governmental 
effectiveness
Democracy Rule  
of law 
Inclusion of 
identity  
groups 
Above-average 
values 
        
Benin -0.06 -0.58 0.89 0.54 1.31 1.37 0.12 
Chile 1.59 1.47 -1.02 3.42 1.25 1.96 0.83 
Ghana 0.10 -0.46 0.68 0.58 0.17 0.19 0.60 
 
Low number of  
violent conflicts 
Mongolia -1.12 -0.39 1.70 0.25 1.25 1.12 0.83 
El Salvador 0.47 0.43 -0.04 0.27 0.95 0.95 1.55 Low to medium 
number of  
violent conflicts 
Thailand 0.91 1.52 -0.28 1.30 0.71 0.53 0.83 
Philippines -0.31 0.55 -0.14 1.07 1.07 0.86 0.12 Medium to high 
number of  
violent conflicts 
Mexico 0.16 1.13 -0.82 0.90 0.41 0.44 -0.60 
Colombia -0.42 1.17 -1.20 0.68 0.59 0.27 1.19 
Sri Lanka 1.14 0.73 0.65 -0.02 0.41 -0.32 -1.68 
High number of 
violent conflicts 
Turkey 0.14 1.17 0.16 0.43 0.23 -0.23 -0.96 
"Gray area"         
Bolivia -0.01 0.06 -1.20 0.01 1.55 1.03 -0.24 
Dominican Republic 1.39 0.69 -0.37 -0.16 0.89 1.12 -0.24 
Honduras -0.50 1.03 -1.06 -0.61 0.95 1.12 0.12 
Namibia -0.20 0.33 -3.43 1.15 1.31 1.20 -1.32 
Malawi 0.08 -1.00 -1.17 -0.58 0.41 0.10 0.83 
Mali -0.10 -1.41 0.72 -0.46 0.89 0.86 -0.84 
Nicaragua -0.20 -0.31 -0.92 -0.57 0.53 0.70 0.48 
 
Low number of  
violent conflicts 
Zambia -1.55 -0.73 -1.43 -0.60 0.23 0.36 0.36 
Brazil -0.18 0.71 -1.47 0.40 1.01 0.53 -0.60 
Ecuador -0.73 0.87 -0.88 -1.28 1.19 1.12 -0.60 
Mozambique 0.60 -1.49 0.77 -0.32 0.17 -0.07 -0.12 
Low to medium 
number of  
violent conflicts 
Senegal -0.58 -0.35 -0.65 0.63 0.17 0.27 0.60 
Bangladesh 0.51 -0.44 1.19 -0.46 1.13 0.36 -0.24 
Cambodia 1.65 -1.06 0.15 -0.93 -0.90 -1.33 1.55 
Guatemala 0.12 0.33 -1.08 -0.16 0.47 -0.15 -1,32 
Nepal 0.47 -0.40 -0.16 -0.70 0.83 0.44 -0.60 
Pakistan -0.05 0.11 1.71 -0.43 -0.01 -0.49 -0.24 
Peru 0.33 0.09 -0.15 0.51 -0.37 0.10 -0.24 
South Africa -0.94 0.70 -1.74 1.48 1.13 1.20 -2.03 
Uganda 0.96 -1.14 0.11 0.13 -0.55 -0.32 -0.12 
Medium to high 
number of  
violent conflicts 
Yemen -0.02 -0.20 1.86 -0.65 -0.55 -1.00 0.83 
Algeria -0.81 1.30 1.29 -0.97 -1.14 -1.00 0.12 High number of 
violent conflicts Indonesia 0.67 0.61 1.55 0.12 -1.08 -0.66 -1.68 
Below-average   
values 
      
Burkina Faso -0.16 -0.95 -1.35 -0.21 -0.43 0.02 0.36 
Madagascar -1.32 -1.30 -0.28 -0.66 1.07 0.27 -0.12 
 
Low number of  
violent conflicts Tanzania -0.70 -1.12 -0.26 -0.78 -0.61 -0.49 1.31 
Guinea -0.33 -0.97 -0.57 -0.60 -1.08 -0.57 -0.60 
Cameroon -1.22 -0.47 -0.59 -0.87 -1.44 -0.83 -0.12 
Low to medium 
number of  
violent conflicts Niger -1.44 -1.44 0.54 -1.46 -0.49 -0.40 -2.03 
Ethiopia -0.56 -2.03 0.41 -0.10 -0.49 -0.57 -1.32 
Kenya -1.15 -0.71 -0.66 -0.90 -1.02 0.53 -0.24 
Nigeria -0.74 -0.99 -0.63 -1.86 -1.02 -0.57 -1.56 
Rwanda -0.12 -0.60 -0.09 -0.79 -1.50 -1.33 -1.56 
Medium to high 
number of  
violent conflicts 
Chad -0.98 -1.82  -0.42 -1.08 -0.74 -1.80 
High number of 
violent conflicts 
Burundi -2.29 -0.21 0.43 -1.57 -1.38 -1.84 -0.36 
* Values in bold are referred to in the text; additionally underlined are distinctive values (1.0 above or -1.0 below 
average). The table contains states that underwent a change of regime or went to/ended war between 1990–2000 
only. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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the other hand, does not completely apply in reverse: With strongly positive values in de-
mocra  of law, South s of 
human security. But it is the on a ith wea alues, 
could possibly also be seen as such. With respec to dem cracy, it can be said that in the 
group h mid  high or hig gre f v t co t the values are almost entirely 
strong east -1.0) (K , Nigeria, Rwanda, Chad, and Burundi).20 Algeria and 
Indonesia, within the gray area, complete  with respo g v es. 
 Look he 19 co ries sifi  stru rally s e h average 
value  democracy and rule of law; ten have, simultaneously, serious deficits out-
side these two di ns and sti mai ble the calculation of the co tion we 
know ificance, orre nd orre ns of de ariables 
with ble turn pos  at a middl el (Pe n’ rel ffi-
cient * a d 0.4650*, respectively). owever, causa  relations betw en studied vari-
ables  t alcu n e co tion. Two st ow de-
gree o vertheles ibi ow rage es in  d sio Tunisia 
and Laos), but th tes have no per d nge egime e or a wa thin the 
studied period (se ). 
Table eak Dem y a ul Law
Types Low  
number of
violent confli
Lo medi
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violent confl
Mediu hig
number of  
violen lic
  
number of  
len flicts
cy and rule  Africa f
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alls with
r outlie
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r here
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. Nepal, w
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kly po
ry in term
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t o
s wit dle to h de es o iolen nflic
ly negative (at l enya
this picture  cor ndin alu
ing at Table
s in terms of
 1, 15 of t unt clas ed as ctu tabl ave above-
mensio ll re n sta . From rrela
 that at a giv
the depende
en sign the c spo ing c latio the indepen nt v
nt varia out itive e lev arso s cor ation coe
of 0.3613 n H l e
cannot be e
f violent co
stablished from he c latio of th rrela ates with a l
nflict ne s exh t bel -ave  valu  both imen ns (
ese sta t ex ience a cha  of r  typ r wi
e Table 5
 5: States with W ocrac nd R e of  
  
cts 
w to um 
num f  
icts
m to h  
t conf ts vio
High
t con
De
states with distinctive deficits  
in other dimensi
(minimum of thr
below average) 
Bolivi
Dominican Rep
Hond
Mada r 
Malaw
Mali 
Nami
Nicara
Paraguay 
Zambia 
 Bangladesh mocratic constitutional  
ons  
ee values  
a 
ublic
uras 
gasca
i 
bia 
gua 
Nepal 
South Africa 
 
Au  
rul
pos
in nsi
(m es  
abo
Tunis
Laos 
Vi  gypt 
ambo
oroc
ger
don
thoritarian sta
e of law, 
tes without 
sessing streng
other dime
inimum of thre
ths  
ons  
e valu
ve average) 
ia etnam E
China 
C dia 
M co 
Al ia 
In esia 
Source n. 
Furth t states w ver low erag lues a id  h egrees 
of vio  frequently exhibit strongly negative values in the dimension “inclusion of 
, 
                              
: Authors’ compilatio
er, it is appa
lent conflict
rent tha ith o all be -av e va nd m dle to igh d
identity groups” (strongly negative: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Chad; still negative: Kenya
                       
20  Ethiopia has a negative but 
group. As the only country in th
not strongly negative value (-0.49) and therefore belongs only partly to this 
is group, Kenya has a positive average value in “rule of law.” 
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Burundi); this is complemented by the results in the gray area for Guatemala and South Africa 
(see Table 6).21 Sri Lanka’s only two negative values—in a country with overall above-average 
results in the dimensions but with high instability—are found in inclusion (strongly negative) 
and rule of law. In the case of Turkey the values are only marginally more positive; here, too, 
the only two negative dimensions are inclusion of identity groups and rule of law. 
Table 6: Inclusion of Identity Groups in Different States 
Types Low  
number of  
violent conflicts
Low to medium 
number of  
violent conflicts
Medium to high  
number of  
violent conflicts 
High  
number of  
violent conflicts
Inclusion of identity groups  
significantly above 
average (> 1.0)  
Costa Rica 
Laos 
Paraguay 
Tunisia 
 
El Salvador 
Vietnam 
China 
Cambodia 
Colombia 
Inclusion of identity groups  
significantly below 
average (< -1.0) 
Namibia Niger Ethiopia 
Guatemala 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Sri Lanka 
Indonesia 
South Africa 
Chad 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
If the states that have not had to ge r shoc that
low degree of violent conflict, 14 are more socia t di-
cat is o al importa ver, c rrelation is me-
diu  fragmentation and polarization of the main 
ide r i levance for structural stabi The inversion of the 
arg to be adequ atemala, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa do poorly 
in terms of structural stability they exhibit good values in many dimensions—
but not in terms of inclusion. Other countries exhibit poor values for inclusion but are con-
sidered more successful in te stability (Niger and, more clearly, Namibia). 
Wh hat especi dimen f enviro l security 
an ality oscillate h bit distinc atures in ed cate-
gories, this is probably due to the global comparability of data nmental security.22 
In summarizing this section, one can state: 
• The synopsis of the features shows that it is not possible to create a typology that allows 
for the formation of clearly distinct (“disjoint”) types with a high practical relevance. 
t ove ks are added, o
lly inclusive 
f the 19 states 
han average. T
 have only a 
his already in
es that this dimension 
m-strong [-0.3481*]). Espe
ntity groups, this facto
ument seems 
f speci nce (howe the statistical o
cially with high
s of high re lity. 
ate: Gu
—even though 
rms of structural 
ile one receives the impr
d social equ
ession t ally the sions o nmenta
eavily and do not exhi tive fe  the appli
 for enviro
                                                     
21  Also negative are Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, and Uganda. Exceptions with positive values for inclu-
sion despite an overall elevated degree of violent conflict are Cambodia and Algeria. 
22  The functionality of the indicator used (access to purified water) is also dependent on the overall water sup-
ply: the problems of a Sahel country are not directly comparable to those of a country neighboring the Ama-
zon. This exemplifies the difficulty of precisely assessing the validity of this dimension, which is important at 
the policy level. 
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• On the other hand, the systematic analysis of the identified values allows for the identifi-
cation of frequent constellations (for example, “democratic states under rule of law and 
low degrees of violence with clear deficits in other dimensions of structural stability” [Bo-
livia, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Zambia] or “states with massive deficits in the inclusion of identity groups 
with high degrees of violence” [Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, South 
olicy strategies for exactly those 
groups of countries. 
5 Conclusion 
This study has endeavored to onditions of structural stability and to test 
the mut conditi com dicators for the as-
sessm dimensions of structural stability ha ated, ave been 
depicted, and on their basis, types of structural stability hav identified. 
The identification of suitable indicators was not equally s even dimensions of 
structural stability. Data were often fragmentary or not available for longer periods of time. 
t variable exists only for the period from 1990 to 2000, the inves-
tigation had to be partially limited to this research period. In various cases a correlation and, 
d 
d 
even dimensions: this relation is not ruled out by 
imp
The most significant positive relationship appeared between the dependent variable “human 
on ” and “government 
“su
Africa, Chad]) that suggest the necessity of developing p
 investigate the prec
ual interconnections of these
ent of the seven 
 pre ons. A plete set of in
s been cre  clusters h
e been 
imple for all s
Since data for the dependen
in turn, a causality problem exists: Between the studied correlations and the actual or as-
sumed causalities an attribution gap generally arises. Linear statements, which would be 
necessary for an unambiguous determination of an instrument mix or the ideal sequence of 
measures, were not possible. These challenges limit the declarative power of the endeavor. 
The initial expectation that the correlation of the various dimensions of structural stability 
with the dependent variable of human security would result in clear types of structural sta-
bility and structural instability was not confirmed. Accordingly, the results are only of a very 
tentative character. This is first of all an expression of the fact that the seven dimensions of 
structural stability are a political postulate—and not the result of a systematic theoretical an
political lessons-learned process or stringent empirical analysis. The assumed interdependent 
relation between the seven dimensions of structural stability is plausible but cannot be strin-
gently proven with the procedure used in this initial study. The same is true of the postulate
mutual enhancement or weakening of the s
the study but cannot be confirmed as a general rule either. This would only be possible with 
roved indicators and further calculations (for example, regression analysis). 
security” on the one hand and the indicators for “democracy” and “rule of law,” respectively, 
 the other. Also, between the dimensions “inclusion of identity groups
effectiveness” and “human security” a positive relation can be identified. The dimensions 
stainable economic growth”; “environmental security”; and—eliminating statistical out-
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lie s–“social equality” are inconclusive. For the intended formation of types, this meant that 
r attributions and mutually enhancing effects were hard to deduce; they may appear 
usible in individual cases, but in order to confirm them as causal, methodological analysis 
t cannot be achieved by quantitative statistical methods alone is required. 
pite these reservations, a preliminary clustering of the countries seems possible: In the 
gory of states that experience only a low degree of violent conflict, a large group—15 of 
states—has above-average values for “democracy” and “rule of law.” Further, 14 of 19 
es in this category ar
r
clea
pla
tha
Des
cate
19 
stat e more socially inclusive than average. It is noteworthy that among 
the states with above-average values are countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The 
group of transitional regimes with below-average values—regardless of the level of vio-
es, without exception. This makes moot the question of the specific 
 achieved. The 
nt 
portant in re-
icy recommendations could be formulated. 
lence—are all African stat
character of statehood and politics in Africa, which would warrant further analysis. 
The declarative power of the approach can be improved considerably with further research 
once the data set is expanded, the studied periods are differentiated, an actor’s perspective is 
added, and a stronger empirical verification of the observed correlations is
data set can be improved by breaking the data down annually instead of into decades (this 
applies especially to the dependent variable) and by basing it on a separate research-based 
index of human security (on the basis of comparative country analyses as is done at the GIGA 
in regard to the countries of the South). 
Secondly, future research should analyze more exactly why changes occur in regard to the 
dependent variable. The consequences of significant change and—above all—the determi-
nants of the dependent variable are what would primarily have to be analyzed. In other 
words, which are the most important aspects of structural stability in regard to significa
positive and negative changes in human security? A dynamic panel analysis would be appli-
cable for the analysis of changes in the dependent variable, and a Tobit Model would be ap-
plicable for the identification of the most important determinants of change. The endogene-
ity—that is, the mutual relations between the variables—would be considered by a compre-
hensive instrumentation estimate at all times. 
By means of these measures, the attribution gap between the observed correlations and the ac-
tual causalities would be reduced noticeably. Statements regarding a useful policy-mix for a 
given situation would be based on a resilient foundation. Through the introduction of an actor 
dimension, that is, a level of activity (“governance matters”), into the research, a dynamic di-
mension could be depicted that would allow for discussion of those cases in which a compara-
ble initial situation leads to different paths and outcomes. This would also be im
gard to those states that we have located in the gray area between above-average values in at 
least five dimensions and below-average values in at least five dimensions of structural stability. 
Finally, we expect that the observed correlations can be understood and explained through 
the completion of a limited number of empirical case studies. In combination with the other 
amplifications of the research approach mentioned, concrete and resilient development pol-
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